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39 Oal.Rptr. 003 '
George M. BREIDERT, at Executor, etc.,
et aI., Plaintiffs an'd Appellants,
Y. '

SOUTHERN PACIFI(:COMPANY et 01.,
Defendants and Respondents.
L. A. 27222.

Supreme Court ~f ~.lIfornla,
In Bank.
Aug. 20,1004.

Action by property owners and tenants
~ascd on inverse
condemnation. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, Leon T. David, J" entercd judgments of dismissal and the property
owners and tenants appealed. The Supreme
Court, Tobriner, J., held that complaint alleging that toss of use of hext intersecting
street as result of closing of grade crossing substantiaJly impaired right' of access
and seriously impaired free and full use of
,property pleaded a loss which was sufficient
to withstand general demurrers.
Reversed with instructions.
Opinion, 34 Cal.Rptr. 237, vacated.

oE property for dama'ges

I. Evidence ¢=48

Court would take judicial notice in
inverse condemnation action of facts set
forth in public utilities commission decision
respecting construction of railroad grade
crossing.
2. Eminent Domain ... 172

Power to determine whether owners
and tenants of land, demanding damages for
invasion of property right: because of a
closing of access to street, had suffered
compensable invasion of rights resided with
courts and matter was not within jurisdiction of public utilities commission which had
ordered the railroad grade crossing closing
which resulted in denial of access.
3. Eminent Domain ~289
Railroad which was an active joint participant in closing of grade crossing which
resulted in denying owners and tenants of
land access to an intersecting public street

was proper party to action for damages for
inverse condemnation.
4. Eminent Domain ...266

"Inverse condemnation" action is an
eminent domain proceeding issued by property owner and principles which affect property rights in inverse condemnation suit are
the same as those in eminent domain action. West's Ann.Const. art. 1, § 14.
See publientlon Words and Phrnscs
for other judicial constructions nnd
definitions.

5. Municipal Corporations

~669

Urban landowner enjoys property
rights. in addition to those which he exercises as :l member of public, in street upon
which his land abuts, and chief among these
is an casement of access in such _street.
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, § 14; West's
Ann.Streets & High.Code, § 100.3.
6. Municipal Corporations

~669

Urban landowner's easement of access
consists of right to get into strect upon
which his property abuts and from thcre,
in a reasonable manner, to the general system of public highways. West's Ann.Const.
art. I, § 14; West's Ann.Streets & High.
Code, § 100.3.
7. Eminent Domain ... 106

Not every interference with property
owner's access to street upon which his property abuts and not every impairment -of
access,
such, to general system of public
streets constitutes a taking which entitles
him to compensation, and right to compensation must rest upon property owner's
showing of substantial impairment of his
right of access to g.eneral system of public
streets.

as

8. Eminent Domain "'307(2)

Determination of wnether property
owner had suffered such a substantial impairment of his right of access to general
system of public streets as to entitle him to
compensation must be reached as a matter
of law, but extent of such impairment must
be fixed as a matter of fact.
9. Eminent Domain e;::,106

A compensable substantial impairment
of property owner's right of acCess to gen-

720
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10. Eminent Domain ~106
Property owner's allegation of impaired access to next intersecting street in one
direction will not constitute an unreasonable
interference with a general fight of access
to the system of public streets nor a substantial impairment of that right, but loss
of access to next intersecting street will be

a significant factor in finding an impairment of general right and obstruction of
access to next intersecting street serves as
one element of such impairment.

II. Eminent Domain 0$=>293(1)
Complaint in inverse condemnation action alleging that closing of grade crossing
with resulting loss of use of next intersecting street substantially impaired property
owner's right of access and had substantially
lessened and impaired free and full use of
property pleaded a loss which was sufficient
to withstand general demurrer.
~147

Claim by property owners and tenants,
suing for damages based on substantial impairment of right of access to streets by the
closing of next intersecting street, as to loss
of good will and inability t~ obtain employees, in so far as they related to loss of
business rather than diminution of value of
property, did not constitute legitimate elements of damage.
13. Eminent Domain 0$=>100(6)
Injury to public by closing of street
does not establish compensable loss to pdva~ landowner unless he is thereby specially
injured.
14. EmInent Domain

_______________________________
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eral system of public streets cannot be
fixed by abstract definition but must be
found in each case on basis of factual situation.

12. Eminent Domain

~

__________________Od_:__

,

~

______________________. . ..
, ..

~147

"aaim that loss of access to next intersecting street impaired access to property
by firemen and policemen in event of
emergency referred to matters too speculative to constitute a compensable loss in inverse condemnation action.

William Katz, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke
Jones and Ralph J. Eubank, Asst. City
Attys., Charles W. Sullivan and Arthur
Karma, Deputy City Attys., E. D. Yeomans
and Walt A. Steiger, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

TOBRINER, Justice.
In this case of inverse condemnation we
must decide whether a property owner who
loses the use of the next intersecting street
which affords him access to the general
system of public streets should be compensated. As we point out. although the
bare allegation of a cul-de-sac does not in
itself suffice to establish a compensable
right, a showing of a substantial impairment
of the property owner's right of access to
the system of public streets does so. Since
the complaint in this case alleges such substantial impairment, it withstands a general
demurrer.
PI.aintiffs are, respectively, the owners,
lessors and lessee of a parcel of improved
real property located in the City of Los
Angeles. Fronting on Vaughn Street, which
runs in an easterly and westerly direction~
the property is situated at' the southeast
corner of Vaughn and the right-of-way of
the. Southern Pacific Railroad, which runs
north and south. Immediately to the west
of the right-of-way and parallel to it, lies
San Fernando Road. The property has
been improved by a one-story factory building used for the manufacture of air-conditioning equipment.
At the time the plaintiffs acquired the
property in 1953, and until 1959, Vaughn
Street crossed the Southern Pacific rightof-way and intersected San Fernando Road ..
Plaintiffs and the public used this Vaughn'
Street crossing as a means of access to and
from San Fernando Road. In April 1959
defendants placed barricades across Vaughn
Street along the easterly and westerly linesof the right-of-way and closed the crossing.
[I] Wc take judicial notice of the following facts, not pleaded in plaintiffs"
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amended complaint" but set forth in In re
G. C. Breidert, Decisi9n No_ 61775 (1%1)
58 Cal.P.U.C. 624 (unreported). By Decision Number 56398, March 25, 1958, the
Public Utilities Commission authorized the
City of "Los Angeles to con'struet -, a grade
crossing over the Southern Pacific right-ofway at Paxton Street, 1360 feet south of
Vaughn Street, and ordered the Vaughn
Street crossing closed. On November 17,
1959, the present plaintiffs requested the
Public Utilities Commission to reopen the
crossing, alleging that- the closing resulted
in hardship to the plaintiff company by
depriving the company and its customers
of access over the right-of-'way at Vaughn
Street.
After a hearing on plaintiffs' application
the commission found that the Vaughn
Str~et crossing ranked as 357th most haz...
ardous of the approximately 4,500 crossings
in Southern California. The commission
concluded that "it is in the public interest,
considering. both safety· factors. and the
needs of the [defendants] to have Vaughn
Street· closed and we !lOW find that there
is insufficient need for 'a 'crossing at Vaughn
Stred -to justify "the 'risk involved.": On
Ailgust 9, 1961,. we denied plaintiffs' peti.
tion "{or '."ITit of. review of the Public :U:tili·.
ties Commission order. On March 30, 1962,

plaintiffs initiated the present action {or
damages arising out of the closing of ·the
crossing. Toe trial 'court sustained dc:;fendants' general .demurr~r to plaintiffs' amended 'complaint and entered judgments of dismissal is to both defendants. Plaintiffs appeal these judgments.

[2] We initially· dispose of two preliminary matters. First, defendants fail to
sustai~ the ,contention that, since the Public
UtiUtif!s Commission" exercises exclusive
jurisdiction to order the closing of railroad
grade crossings, this court cannot adjudicate th~ preSent action. Plaintiffs do not
I. An lDverae, condemnation action is an
eminent domain proceeding initiated by
the property owner rather than the eondemner. Thei principles which affect the
parties' rights in an in\'crse condemna-

seek ah order to reopen the crossing; rather
they demand, damages for an invasion _of a
property right. The power to determine
whether the plaintiffs have suffered a com..
pensable invasion' of their rights resides
with the courts. (S. H. Chase Lumber Co.
v. Railroad Com. (1931) 212.Cat 691, 706,
300 P. 12; Bacich v. Board of- Control
(1943) 23 Cal2d343, 349, 144 P.2d .818.).
[3] Second, defendant railroad errone'
ously urges that it is not a proper party defendant to the present adion. Since defendant railroad was an active joint· particip~nt
in closing the crossing, it is a proper,party
to the presertt litigation. (See Talbott v.
Turlock Irr. Dist.' (1933) 217 Cal. 504, 506,
19 P,2d 980; Eachus v. Los Angeles etc, Ry.
Co. (1894) 103 Cal. 614, 621, 37 P. 750-)
[4] The principal issue of the case resolves into whether _the closing of the:
Vaughn Street crossing so impaired 'plain~
tiffs' right of access in that street as to constitute a taking or damaging of ,property
en~i~.lirig them to compensation. P'laintiffs~
claim rests upon' the provision of the' California 'Constitution that private property
may not be taken or damaged for pub-lic' 'tiS~
without just compensation (Ca1.~o~st.. art.I, § 14). Plaintiffs thus purport to state a
tau'se of . action in inverse condemnation. l
[S,6J We have long recognized that·'the
urban· landowner enjoys property rights,
additional to those which he exercises as a
me,mber of the public, in the street upon
which his land abuts. Chief among· thes\!
is an easement of access in such street.
(People ex rei. Department of Public Works
v. Symons (1960) 54 CaI.2d 855, 866, 9
Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451; People ex ret.
Department of Public Works v. Rus:selt
(1957) 48 Ca!.2d 189, 195, 309 P.2dIO;
Badch v. Board pf Contr~l. supra,23 Cat.
2d 343, 349-350, 144 P.2d 818; People v.
Ricciardi (1943) 23 CaL2d 390, 397, 144
P.2d 799; Rose v. State of California (1942)
tion -suit are the lame as those iq QD cmi~
nent domain action. (See &118 Y. State
of California, Rpm, 19' Cal.1d 113. 128
P.2d 505; Bncich Y. Bonrd of Cont_rol,
BUDra. 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818.)

.
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CaL

394 PAOIl'IO REPORTER, ad SERIES

19 Cal.2d 713, 727-728, 123 P 2d 505; must rest upon the property owner's 'show..
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., supra, ing of a substantial impairment of his right
103 Cal. 614, 617-618, 37 p, 750.)' This of access to the general system of public
easement consists of the right to get into streets.
the street upon which the landowner's prop[8] The determination of whether such
erty abuts and from there, in a reasonable
substantial
impairment has been established
manner, to the general system of public
streets. (See Bacich v. Board of Control, must be reached as a matter of law. The
supra,23 Cal.2d 343, 351, 355, 144 P.2d 818; extent of such impairment must be fixed
People ex reI. Department of Public Works as-a matter of fact. The cases have conv. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 223, 5 Cal. sistently held that the trial court must rule,
Rptr. 151, 352 P.2d 519; Wolff v. City of as a matter of law, whether the interferLos Angeles (1920) 49 Cal.App. 400, 405, ence with access constitutes a substantial or
3
193 P. 862; Warren v. Iowa State Highway unreasonable impairment. Thus in People
v.
Ricciardi,
supra,
Z3
Cal2d
390, 402-403,
Commission (1958) 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.
144
P.2d
799,
80.5-$6,
we
said:
"It was
2d 60, 67; Wilson v. Kansas City (Mo.
1942) 162 S. W.2d 802, 804; State ex rei. • • • within the province of the trial
court and not the jury to pass upon the quesState Highway Commission v. Silva (1963)
tion
whether under the facts presented, the
71 N.M. 350, 378 P.2d 595, 599; see generdefendants' right of access will be substanally Freeways and the Rights of Abutting
tially impaired. If it will be so impaired the
Owners (1951) 3 Stan.LRev. 298, 302.)
extent of the impairment is for the jury
[7] To designate the right, however, is to determine. This is but another way of
not to deHneate its precise scope. Not saying that the trial court and not the jury
must decide whether in the particular case
every interference with the property owner's
there will be an actionable interference
access to the street upon which his property
with the defendants' right of access." 4.
abuts and not every impairmant of access,
as such} to the general system of public
[9] Substantial impairment cannot be
streets constitutes a taking which entitles fixed by abstract definition; it must be
him to compensation. Such compensation found in each case upon the basis of the
2. See also StreebJ and Highways Code,
.ection 100.3 which provides that the
construction of freewQ1s "shan not affect
private property rights of access, and
any such rights taken or damaged within the meaning of Article I. Section 14,
of the State Constitution for such free_
way shall be acquired in a manner provided by law."
3. "Wnether a substantial impairment of a
property right exists is a question for
the court to determine under all the
fncts of tbe case. Once thia determination haa been made. ita extent is then
determined by the jury." (Del Guercio.
Severance Damages and Valuation of
F.o.scments, Cont. Ed. Bar, Condemnation
Practice, ch. 4, p. 73.)

4. A similar analysis occurs in other leading right of access cases. In Rose v.
Sin,,, Bupra, 19 C.I.2d 713, 729, 123
P .2.1 ri05, G15. in finding that substantial
impairment of access in the narrowing

of an abutting street resulted from construction of 11 subway, we Rid: "The waues before the trial court in the Cilse at
bar were, whether plaintiffs' right of acccss - - - was 8Ublltontiallll and
unrea80nabzV impaired - - • and,
if so, the amount of damage suffered as
the result of such interference. - • ."
(Italics added.) More recently, in People
v. Russell, supra, 48 Cal.2d 189, 309 P.
2d 10. which alao involved the narrowing
of an abutting road, we noted that the
duty rests with the trial court to determine as a question of law. whether the
property owner had suffered substantial
impairment of access. Only if - it so
:finds may it submit the question of dam·
ages to the jury. (See also Eachus v.
Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., supra. 103 Cal.
614, 37 P. 750; McCandless v. City of
Lo. Angele. (1931) 214 C.t 61, 4 P.2d
139; Lane :v. Son Diego Elec. Ry. Co.

(1929) 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109.)
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[10] The recognition that the easement
of access includes a right not only to reach
the general system of public streets,' but to
do so over either of _the next intersecting
streets in two directions, does not mean that
in every case an allegation of impaired ae·
cess to the next intersecting $treet in one
direction will establiSh a compensable right.
It will not constitute an "unreasonable
interference" in the words of Rose v. State,

supra, 19 Cal2d at page m, 123 P 2d 50S,
with the general right of access to the
system of public streets. Nor as to such ac·
cess does it effect, as described in People v.
Ricciardi, supra,· 23 Cal2d at page 398,
144 P.2d 799, a "substantial impairment" of
that right. Loss of access to the next in·
tersecting street will be a significant factor
in finding an impairment of the general
right; and, as Baeich held, obstruction of
access to the next intersecting street serves
as one element of such impairment.
The court's statement in Bacich that not
every cul-de-sac case is compensable supports this analysis. Thus at page 355 of 23
Ca12d, at page 826 of 144 P.2d,we acknowledged that, "[o]ne might imagine many
circumstances * • • in which- recovery
should not be permitted or where the rea·
sons for recovery in the cul·de-sac cases
might not be logically applied, but we are
here concerned 'with the particular facts of
this case and do not purport to declare the
law for all cases under all circumstances."
Moreover, the court's reliance in Bacicb
upon such cases as Rose v.' State of Cali·
fomia, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505;
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., supra,
103 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750; McCandless v. City
of Los Angeles, supra, 214 Cal. 67, 4 P.2d
139, and Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co.,
supra, 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109, all of which
affirm the proposition that recovery depends
upon a showing of substantial impairment
of the general right of access, supports this
reading of Bacich.
That loss of access to the next intersecting street does not necessarily create a
cause of action for impairment of the gen·
eral right of access is further recognized by
our recent holding in People ex reI. Department of Public Works v. Symons, supra,
54 Cal.2d 855, 9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451.
In Symons defendant landowners appealed
from a judgment limiting severance dam·
ages in an eminent domain proceeding in·
"oIving the acquisition of a portion of de-

It. • •

state these propositioDs thaD to apply'
them."

factual situation,' ~While certain general
rules have been set forth in the various decisions which have considered the nature
and scope of this right, each case must be
considered upon its own fact.... .(People v.
Russell, supra, 48 Ca1.2d at p. 195, 309 P 2d
at p. 14).
Plaintiffs contend, however, that Baeich v.
Board of Control, supra, 23 Cal2d 343, 144
P.2d 818, compels a holding that owners,
such' as plaintiffs in the instant case, whose
access to the next intersecting street in one
direction is severed, suffer substantial impairment as a matter of law. The holding
in Baeich is not so broad. Baeich arose up-

to

on a demurrer the plaintiff's ,complaint alleging that plaintiff should recover damages because a street improvement deprived
him of access to the
intersecting street

next

in one direction. The court decided only
that a complaint which aUeges' impairment
of access to the next intersecting street in
one direction does not succumb to a demur·
rer by reason of that allegation. The court
recognized that although the right of access
consists essentially of a right to get into the
street upon which one's property abuts, and
to travel in a reasonable manner from there
to the general system of public streets (23
Ca1.2d at pp. 351, 355, 144 P2d 818), it also
includes a "right to pass to the next intersecting streets." (Id. 23 Cal2d at p. 352,
144 P 2d at p. 824.) The court declared, "It
would seem clear that the reasonable. modes
of egress and ingress embrace access to .the.
next intersecting street in both directions."
(Id. 23 Cal2d at p. 352, 144 P.2d at p. 832.)

5. All Witkin, Summary of CalifLaw. p.
2051, states,
it if easier to

----------------------.----------------------------724
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fendants' residential property to convert
the tenninus of the street upon which it
abutted into a cul-de-sac and thus provide
a turn-around area. Creation of the cul-desac severed defendants' access to the next
intersecting street in one direction. We
affirmed the trial court's denial of damages
for injury to defendants' remaining land on
the ground that the improvement which
caused the loss, that is the fr.eeway itself,
did not lie upon the property taken from
plaintiff. (People ex reI. Department of
Public Works v. Symons, supra, 54 Ca1.2d
at p. 861, 9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451.)
We affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the decrease in value of
defendants' property caused by "such facts,
among others, as the change from a quiet
residential area, loss of privacy, loss of view
* * • noise, fumes and dust from the
freeway, loss of access over the area now
occupied by the freeway} and misorientation
of the house on its lot after the freeway
construction." (Id. 54 Cal.2d at p. 858, 9
Ca1.Rptr. at p. 365, 357 P.2d at p. 453; italics
added.) We .concluded that in the absence
of a right to severance damages this testi~
many related to noncompensable items of
damage. Thus we denied recovery because
defendants' bare showing that their property
was placed in a cul-de-sac did not of itself
satisfy' the requirement of substantial im~
pairment of access.6
In summary, the rule which emerges constitutes one of substantial impairment of
6. The implications of Symons have not
gone unnoticed. In Rosenthal v. City
of Lo" Angeles (1001) 103 Cnl.App.2d
20. 13 CnI.Rptr. 824. the city rerouted
Hoscoc Boulevard, the street upon which
plaintiff's property abutted. causing it to
bypass plaintiff's premises, and leave
them on a short street closed at both
ends. Formerly plaintiff had aC<'ess to
his property over Roscoe Boulevard from
the east nod over two streets intersecting Roscoe from the north; nfter
the improvements acc('~s was limited to
tlle two intersecting streets. In denying plaintiff recovery for impairment of
his right of nccess the court stated;
"The clear cOlllmand of * ,.. * Symons * * * is that * • • dimin·

the right of access. Although destruction
of access to the next intersecting street in
one direction constitutes a significant factor
in determining whether the landowner is
entitled to recovery, it alone cannot justify
recovery in the absence of facts which dis·
close a substantial impairment of access.
[11] We tum next to the application of
the test of substantial impairment to the
facts of the present case. Plaintiffs claim
that the closing of the Vaughn Street cross~
ing substantially impaired their right of
access. They allege that "Loss of access to
San Fernando Road from Vaughn Street,
and from San Fernando Road to Vaughn
Street, has substantially lessened and seri~
ously impaired the free and full use by
plaintiffs of their property." Their com~
plaint alleges the serious impact of this loss
of access upon the plaintiff's real property.
Thus the complaint sufficiently pleads a loss
sufficient to withstand defendants' general
demurrer.
[12] We note, however, that certain of
the complaint's allegations incorporate items
of possible damage wholly immaterial to a
cause of action for impairment of the ease~
ment of aCcess. Thus plaintiffs' claims of
lost good will and inability to obtain em·
ployees, insofar as they relate to loss of
business rather than diminution of the value
of plaintiffs' real property, do not constitute
legitimate elements of damage.'
ished value attributable to the diminished
access due to a public improvement on
neighboring property is not compensable. It may be noted that in Symons

there was 6'ven a l088 of acces8 to the
next intersecting street," (Id. 193 Cal.
App.2d at p. 33, 13 Ca1.Rptr. at p. 827;
italics added.)

7. People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Ca1.2d
300, 396, 144 P.2d 799, 802 states the
rule as follows: ... * • injury to the
business of the owner or occupant of
the property does not form an element of
the compensating damages to be awarded. (Citation,) This is so because it
is' only the value of, and the damage to
the property itself, which may be considered. A particular business might be

:VALENTA v.OOUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
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PlaintilIs also complain that lithe closing
of Vaughn Street requires trucks servicing
the property of plaintiffs, and other industdes along Vaughn Street, to use Bradley
Avenue, to Paxton Street; said Bradley
Avenue is a narrow, residential street and
the ·use of the same by heavy trucks is dan~
gCTOUS and adverse to the best interests of
the public using the-' same; if said Vaughn
Street crossing is permitted to remain obstructed and dosed, the 'access to the property of said plaintiffs by fire, police and
other public services, in the event of emergencies, will be greatly' impaired and delayed,"
[13,14] The first of these contentions
relat,es to matters already considered fully
by the Public _Utilities Commission (In re
G. C. Breidert, Decision ,No. 61775, supra,
58 Cal.P.U.C. 624 (unreported)), and in any
event injury to the public does not establish
a compensable loss to a private landowner
unless he is thereby specially injured. (E.g.,
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry., supra, 103
Cal. 614, 37 P. 750.) Tho. second contention
refers to' matters too speculative to produce
a compensable 10ss.8 (See "Rose v. State of
California, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 738. 123 P.
2d 50S.)

At a time when the tremendous growth of
population ,of this state compels rerouting
and rearrangement of streets and highways,
the claimed damages to property owners
from loss of access to the next intersecting
street and to the general system of streets
must be more than formal. It must be a true
loss; it must be substantial. entirely destroyed and yet n9t diminish
the actual value of the property for its
1lighest and best usc." (See HoUowny v.
Pureell (1950) 3,'l CaI.2d 220. 230. 217
P.2d 005; People v. Sayig (1951) 101
Cal.App.2d 890. 226 P.2d 702; City of
Los Angeles v. Geiger (1949) 94 CaL
App.2d 180. 191. 210 P.2d 717; Wolff
v. City of Los Angeles (1920) 49 Cal.
App. 400. 402. 193 P. 862; Oakland v.
Pacific Coast Lumber etc. Co. (1915)
171 Cal. 392, 399, 153 P. 705.)

725

The judgments are reversed with instruetions to overrule the general demurrers and
to permit the parties to proceed in a manner
consistent with this opinion.
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, McCOMB, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur.
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring).
Although I adhere to the views set forth
in my dissenting opinion in Bacich v. Board
of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 366-380, 144 P.2d
818, that case is the law of this state until it
is overruled. I therefore concur in the
judgment herein under the compulsion of
the Bacich case.
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39 CaI.Rptr. 009
Ronald J. VALENTA.t al., Plalntl1ra
and Appellants,
Y.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES .t aI.,
Defendants and Respondents.

L. A. 27655.
Supreme Court of California.

In Bank.

Aug. 20. 19M.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 18. 1964.

Action for damage to plaintiffs' property resulting from the closing of access to
a highway. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Macklin Fleming and Leon T.
David, JJ., sustained defendants' general
8. "Plnintiffs also claim damages for the
taking of an easement over the Vaughn
Street crossing and _for maintenance of
n nuisnnce. PlaintUfs have no property
right in the public crossings (see City
of San Mateo v. Railroad Com. (1937) 9
Ca1.2d 1. 68 P.2d 713) and plaintiJfs
state no calise of action for mnintennnce
Q~ a nuisance unless they show that they
have been specially injured (see Bigley
v. Nunan (1879) 53 C~"t1. 403).

